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C
rAbstract
This paper studies the characteristics of the workers in the informal economy and
whether internal migrants treat this sector as a temporary location before moving
on to the organised or formal sector to improve their lifetime income and living
conditions. We limit our study to the Indian urban (non-agricultural) sector and
study the characteristics of the household heads that belong to the informal sector
(self-employed and informal wage workers) and the formal sector. We find that
household heads that are less educated, come from poorer households, and/or are
in lower social groups (castes and religions) are more likely to be in the informal
sector. In addition, our results show strong evidence that the longer a rural migrant
household head has been working in the urban areas, ceteris paribus, the more likely
that individual has moved out of the informal wage sector. These results support the
hypothesis that, for internal migrants, the informal wage labour market is a stepping
stone to a secured life in the formal sector.
JEL codes: 017; J15; J61; J42.
Keywords: Informal labour markets; Migrant; Caste; Religion1. Introduction
In most developing countries, there is a large sector of the economy that is called the
informal sector or the unorganized sector. Employment in the informal labour market
plays an important role in most developing economies. Very broadly, the informal
labour market consists of workers in the informal sector, plus casual workers in the
formal sector. The informal labour market is a very large part of the agricultural sector,
but is also a significant part of the urban sector. There is a difference between employ-
ment in the formal sector and the informal sector in terms of the conditions of work,
whether workers are subject to government taxes, have access to social security or in-
surance, are casual or contract workers, and whether or not they receive the minimum
wages1.
The informal economy is a very important sector of the Indian economy. The National
Council of Applied Economic Research estimates that the informal sector-“unorganized
sector”-generates about 62% of GDP, 50% of national savings and 40% of national exports
(ILO 2002), p. 30. In terms of employment, the informal economy provides for about
55% of total employment (International Labour Organisation 2002), p. 142. Urban areas
(especially large cities) attract numerous migrants from both the rural areas and from
smaller urban towns and cities in the hope of a better life.Shonchoy and Junankar; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited.
2014
Shonchoy and Junankar IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 2 of 272014, 3:9
http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/9The Indian labour market can be conceived of as a segmented market. One segment
is the formal sector composed of workers who have salaried work, good working con-
ditions, and are employed in organised business. The other segment is the informal
economy consisting of small self-employed traders and business people, and casual
workers in the informal or formal sectors. Some individuals are born into wealthy
families who own large businesses and hence are in the formal sector by right of birth.
Others who are born with parents from the professional classes would almost certainly
have education from good schools and universities, and have a network of contacts that
would ensure their joining the ranks of the employed in the formal sector. Some indi-
viduals may have built up sufficient assets over time to set up small businesses and
hence enter the formal sector. However, most workers in the formal sector enter the
sector through their educational achievements, or by birth (children of rich people) and
through social networks. For someone who comes from a disadvantageous background
(either in terms of income or belonging to a socially backward caste or religion) the
only way to enter the formal sector is via education in “good” schools3 or universities.
Even with a good education, entry into the formal sector is often based on family con-
nections. The Indian government has for some time had a policy of positive discri-
mination for the Dalits, and as a result they may have a higher probability of finding a
job in the formal (government) sector. Migrants (especially from rural areas) who come
into urban areas would likely have to work in the informal sector for some time before
they build good networks enabling them to move into the formal sector.
The literature on the role of the informal sector in developing countries has oscillated
between treating the informal sector as a backward sector that is holding back eco-
nomic development to a dynamic sector that is helping to develop the economy rapidly
without straining foreign currency balances and with relatively low demands for (real)
capital goods (see Mazumdar (1976), Weeks (1975), Bromley (1978), Gerxhani (2004))4.
The informal sector is considered to be a pre-capitalist form of production compared
to the formal sector which is a profit maximising capitalist sector. There is a large vol-
ume of literature on rural–urban migration (see, Harris and Todaro (1970)) that
examines migrants arriving in the city and initially finding work in the informal sector,
then moving on to better paid work in the formal sector. Fields (2009) developed an
early model of the informal sector as a “way station” along the path toward a formal
job in urban areas (De Mel et al. (2010)) which has been followed by others. This view
of the informal sector as a temporary abode for migrants has been disputed (among
others) by Mazumdar (1976). The debate has also ranged over whether informal sector
workers are living in poor conditions with low incomes, or whether some of the infor-
mal sector workers are there out of choice and have a comfortable life (see Meng 2001,
Perry 2007). Some individuals may have employment in the formal sector and work in
the informal sector as well.
Given the setup of the urban labour market in India, some of the important issues to
investigate are (1) whether individuals working in the informal sector are migrants and
whether they move out of the informal sector into the formal sector after a few years;
(2) whether they are from disadvantaged social and ethnic groups who do not have
social networks to enter the formal sector; and finally (3) whether those with low levels
of education and skills are unable to enter formal sector employment and have to find
low paid works in the informal sector (Mitra (2004, 2008)).
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economy and whether migrants treat this sector as a permanent base or only as a tempor-
ary location before moving on to the organised or formal sector to improve their lifetime
income and lifestyle. We limit our study to the Indian urban (non-agricultural) sector and
study the characteristics of the household heads that belong to the informal sector
(self-employed and informal wage workers) and the formal sector. We find that members
who come from the lower social groups (castes and religions) are more likely to be in the
informal sector. We distinguish between migrants in urban location who came from rural
areas and those who came from other urban areas. We find that rural migrant’s likelihood
of staying in the informal wage labour sector is inversely related to the length of time a
rural migrant spends in an urban area.
In Section 2 below, we clarify the definition of informal labour markets and briefly
review the literature; Section 3 provides a detailed discussion of the properties of the
urban informal sector in India; Section 4 discusses the lexicographic preferences that
people have over formal sector, self-employment, and informal wage labour; Section 5
sets up an econometric model for estimating the probability of working in the informal
sector and provides some results, while Section 6 provides results using a multivariate
logit model; Section 7 concludes with a summary of the results. In general, we find
that the longer the duration of a migrant in the urban sector the more likely s/he will
have moved out of the informal sector.2. The informal labour market: definitions and a review of some earlier
studies
In the developing country context, the informal sector is sometimes defined in
terms of the activities of the enterprises (ILO, 1972) and sometimes in terms of
the kind of work done by individuals as employees or as self-employed people
(Hart, 1973). There exists great heterogeneity in informality: there is the “intra-firm
margin where firms may be partly formal and partly informal, the inter-sectoral
margin between formal and informal firms, and the inter-sectoral margin of formal
and informal workers operating through the labour market” Perry et al. (2007).
The International Labour Organisation (1972) characterised the informal sector as:
(a) Ease of entry
(b) Reliance on indigenous resources
(c) Family ownership of enterprise
(d) Small scale of operation, often defined in terms of hired workers less than (say) ten
(e) Labour-intensive methods of production and adapted technology
(f ) Skills acquired outside the formal school system
(g) Unregulated and competitive markets
Whereas the formal sector was characterised by:
(a) Difficult entry
(b) Frequent reliance on overseas resources
(c) Corporate ownership
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(e) Capital-intensive and often imported technology
(f ) Formally acquired skills, often expatriate
(g) Protected markets (through tariffs, quotas, and licenses)
Hart (1973) discussed the informal sector in terms of the working conditions of the
individuals and whether they worked for wages with good conditions or informally as
self-employed workers. Informal activities included:
(a) Farming, market gardening, self employed artisans, shoemakers, tailors, etc.
(b) Working in construction, housing, road building
(c) Small scale distribution, e.g. petty traders, street hawkers, etc.
(d) Other services, e.g. barbers, shoe-shiners etc.
(e) Beggars
(f ) Illegal activities like drug pushing
Formal sector income earning activities included:
(a) Public sector wage earners
(b) Private sector wage earners (on permanent contracts, not casual workers)
Sengupta (2009), p. 3 defined the informal economy thus:2.1 Informal sector
The unorganised sector consists of all unincorporated private enterprises owned
by individuals or households engaged in the sale and production of goods and
services operated on a proprietary or partnership basis and with less than ten total
workers.2.2 Informal worker/employment
Unorganised workers consist of those working in the unorganised sector or households,
excluding regular workers with social security benefits provided by employers and the
workers in the formal sector without any employment and social security benefits
provided by employers.2.3 Informal economy
The informal sector and its workers plus the informal workers in the formal sector
constitute the informal economy.3. The Indian informal labour market: some background information
A recent report of the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector
by the Government of India (Sengupta 2009) found that 86% of the total employment
in 2004–2005 was in the informal sector. Further, the agricultural sector consisted
almost entirely of informal workers. The non-agricultural workers in the informal
sector were 36.5% of the total, most of whom were self-employed. From 1999–2000 to
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mal workers (Sengupta 2009, p.14). The NSSO (2012), p ii document found that in
2009–2010 in the non-agriculture sector, nearly 71% of the workers in rural areas and
67% in urban areas worked in the informal sector. It found that the informal sector
activities are concentrated mainly in the manufacturing, construction, wholesale and
retail trades, and transport, storage and communication industries.
Our study used data from the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) 2005, con-
ducted by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor,
Michigan, USA. The survey is a nationally representative, multi-topic survey of 41,554
households in 1,503 villages and 971 urban neighbourhoods across India. The data set
has detailed information on household employment by industry and occupation, and
detailed information about household characteristics including age, education, ethnicity,
religion, and migration status. In this study we have limited our analysis to workers in
the urban sector who are not engaged in any agricultural activities.
Our data-set consisted of 12,056 heads of households for whom we had data on their
age, education, marital status, gender, religion, caste, income source, assets, migration
status and years since migration into the urban sector.
We define the urban informal sector as artisans, petty traders, small business people (who
do not hire any labour), and non-agricultural casual workers in the informal or formal
sectors. The informal sector consists of the self-employed and informal wage labour. We
define self-employment as petty traders who do not hire any workers and those in the orga-
nised trade/business category who do not hire any workers. Note that this is a stricter
definition than that suggested by, for example, Sengupta (2009). The informal wage labour
category covers those who are in the informal sector but are not self-employed, i.e., the
artisans, and non-agricultural labourers who are casually employed. The formal sector
consists of salaried employees, professionals, and organised trade/business people who hire
workers. In our study we limited our analysis to only the heads of the representative house-
holds. The summary statistics of our sample is depicted in Table 1.
It is interesting to notice the industry and occupational distribution of the formal and
informal sectors of the economy in our sample data (see Figure 1). Most of the informal
wage labour is in manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trades, restaurants, and
hotels, and in community, social and personal services. Self-employment is concentrated
(not surprisingly) in the wholesale and retail trades, restaurants, and hotels. Informal wage
labour is concentrated in occupations: production and related workers, transport equipment
operators and labourers (presumably unskilled workers) (see Figure 2).
If we look at the distribution of migrants moving into these sectors, (see Figure 3) we
find that 61% of the migrants work in the formal sector; almost 10% are self-employed
entrepreneurs and 29% are informal wage workers.
A high proportion of migrants (28%) are working primarily in the community,
personal and social services, 23% in wholesale and retail trades, restaurants and hotels,
and 28% in manufacturing (see Figure 4).
A high proportion of migrants (30%) are employed as production and related
workers, transport equipment operators and labourers while almost 29% are sales and
service workers (see Figure 5). It is interesting to note that the main income source for
migrants (50.14%) is salaried employment; another 21.09% are in non-agricultural
labour (see Figures 6).
Table 1 Summary statistics
Formal Informal Total
Male 0.902 0.935 0.916
(0.297) (0.246) (0.277)
Rural to urban migration 0.283 0.246 0.267
(0.45) (0.431) (0.443)
Rural to urban migration duration 4.337 3.595 4.023
(9.077) (8.355) (8.787)
Income (in Rupees) 103171.280 49812.840 80625.834
(124176.363) (51689.736) (103573.581)
Age 45.968 43.181 44.791
(11.936) (12.299) (12.169)
Size of the Household 4.842 5.066 4.937
(2.089) (2.089) (2.092)
Married 0.984 0.983 0.984
(0.124) (0.128) (0.126)
Primary Education 0.053 0.148 0.093
(0.223) (0.355) (0.290)
Secondary Education 0.168 0.301 0.224
(0.374) (0.459) (0.417)
Matriculation Complete 0.177 0.170 0.174
(0.382) (0.376) (0.379)
Tertiary Education 0.163 0.099 0.136
(0.370) (0.299) (0.343)
Graduate 0.399 0.123 0.283
(0.490) (0.328) (0.450)
Adivasi 0.041 0.024 0.033
(0.197) (0.152) (0.180)
Dalit 0.143 0.178 0.158
(0.350) (0.382) (0.365)
Muslim 0.108 0.218 0.154
(0.310) (0.413) (0.361)
Father's Occupation: Professional 0.111 0.056 0.089
(0.314) (0.230) (0.285)
Father's Occupation: Executive 0.030 0.010 0.022
(0.169) (0.098) (0.145)
Father's Occupation: Clerk 0.108 0.036 0.079
(0.311) (0.186) (0.270)
Father's Occupation: Sales 0.132 0.189 0.155
(0.338) (0.392) (0.362)
Father's Occupation: Service 0.113 0.085 0.102
(0.316) (0.279) (0.302)
Father's Occupation: Agro 0.352 0.341 0.347
(0.478) (0.474) (0.476)
Father's Occupation: Labourer 0.155 0.284 0.207
(0.362) (0.451) (0.405)
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Father's Education: Primary 0.222 0.226 0.224
(0.416) (0.418) (0.417)
Father's Education: Secondary 0.236 0.140 0.196
(0.425) (0.347) (0.397)
Father's Education: Tertiary 0.050 0.014 0.035
(0.218) (0.119) (0.184)
Father's Education: Graduation 0.063 0.013 0.042
(0.243) (0.115) (0.201)
N 6962 5094 12056
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and informal wage labour) show interesting patterns. As one would suspect, Brahmins
and people belong to high caste are more likely to be in the formal sector, compared to
the lower social castes and Muslims. If we divert our attention to the distribution of
people by caste and religion based on the principal source of household income, as
depicted in Table 2, we see that Brahmins and people belong to high caste are more
likely to be salaried workers or professionals, whilst Dalits and Muslims are more likely
to be non-agricultural labourers or artisans (see Figure 7).
When we look at the distribution of occupations by caste and religion, as depicted in
Table 3, we note that Brahmins and high caste people are more likely to be in the
higher level occupations, while Dalits and Muslims are more likely to be in the lower
level occupations.Figure 1 Distribution of employment across industries.
Figure 2 Distribution of households across occupations.
Figure 3 Employment category based on migration status.
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Figure 4 Migrants by industry.
Figure 5 Migrants by occupation.
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Figure 6 Migrants and income source.
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We assume that individuals would, in general, prefer to work in the formal sector,
either as employees or as owners/managers5. This is based on the idea that the formal
sector provides a better life not only in terms of present and future income, but also in
terms of better working conditions (e.g., security of tenure, social security benefits,
access to unions, safer working conditions). If they are unable to enter the formal sec-
tor, we assume that they would prefer to be self-employed (as long as their expected in-
comes are not below that in the informal wage sector). Employees in the informal wage
sector would prefer to become self-employed if they have access to credit to set up
small businesses. Many of them may simply be “waiting” for a job in the formal sector.
In the Harris-Todaro model, rural migrants come to the urban areas as long as their
expected wages (urban wage multiplied by the probability of finding a job) are greaterTable 2 Caste and religion by source of income
Non-Ag labour Artisan Petty traders Business Salaried Professionals Total
Brahmin 56 67 68 136 705 43 1,075
High caste 254 182 277 536 1,429 59 2,737
OBC 875 437 341 446 1,438 56 3,593
Dalit 664 205 105 108 803 18 1,903
Adivasi 97 11 16 35 238 6 403
Muslim 598 295 211 256 471 29 1,860
Sikh, Jain 9 20 32 61 129 5 256
Christian 54 19 4 20 126 6 229
Total 2,607 1,236 1,054 1,598 5,339 222 12,056
Source: India Human Development Survey.
Figure 7 Caste and religion by sector.
Shonchoy and Junankar IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 11 of 272014, 3:9
http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/9than their rural subsistence wage. Migrants who do not find work in the urban formal
sector then enter the urban informal sector which is meant to be a form of “wait un-
employment"6. Essentially, we are arguing that individuals have lexicographic pre-
ferences over these choices. However, what we observe is a reduced form depending on
the household head’s choice and success in the formal labour market, and the con-
straints in the credit market that determine whether s/he can become self-employed.
Informal wage labour then is a residual category.
In fact if we look at the actual income (based on our sample), we find that the
incomes of these three groups overlap to some extent, with the lowest income being in
informal wage labour, followed by self-employment, followed by formal sector income.
Figure 8 presents the kernel densities of the logs of informal wage labour, informal self-Table 3 Caste and religion by occupation
Brahmin High
caste





195 280 245 105 49 72 27 22 995
Administrative, Executive
and Managerial Workers
135 357 427 147 28 243 35 27 1,399
Clerical and Related Workers 188 329 361 191 50 84 23 24 1,250
Sale Workers 190 746 765 235 52 445 97 21 2,551
Service Workers 71 172 210 248 44 87 11 18 861
Production, Transport
and Labourers
159 551 1,236 799 141 732 41 67 3,726
Missing 137 302 349 178 39 197 22 50 1,274
Total 1,075 2,737 3,593 1,903 403 1,860 256 229 12,056
Source: India Human Development Survey.
Figure 8 Kernel densities of log income by employment.
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income is distributed to the left, informal self-employment income is in the middle,
and formal income is to the right of the other distributions. There is some overlap at
the lower tails of the distributions, but self-employment and formal incomes have tails
spread out at the higher income levels7.
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reveals that there are significant differences in these ker-
nel densities. (All pair-wise Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are statistically significant with a
p-value of 0.000). Table 4 provides some summary statistics to illustrate the differences
in the distribution of incomes. As discussed above, the mean (log) income in the formal
sector is greater than that for the self-employed and that is greater than that for infor-
mal wage labour. The only curious result seems to be that the minimum of the formal
sector is lower than that of the other two groups.
To be in the formal sector, domestic capitalists need to have significant amounts of
capital and access to credit. Inheritance plays a large part in providing either the ori-
ginal capital or access to credit. Multinationals come in with large amounts of capital
with technology that is labour saving (embodied technological change). Employment in
the formal sector is then limited by the use of imported technology and limited
amounts of capital. Note that only a limited amount of labour-capital substitution is
possible because of embodied technology.Table 4 Distribution of log incomes by sector
Variable: log of income Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Formal 6916 11.2313 0.81603 6.21461 15.6904
Self-employment 1324 10.7466 0.76783 6.8024 13.7695
Informal wage labour 3744 10.4617 0.70924 6.44883 13.731
Source: India Human Development Survey.
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or employers using efficiency wage ideas, or by multinational firms that constrain
wages. Employers in the formal sector ration employment by using education/experi-
ence as an index of productivity, and using religion/caste as a signal for productivity
(statistical discrimination). Given two people with the same education/skill levels, they
would prefer a high caste Hindu to a low caste Hindu or a Muslim. Note: being in the
formal economy is not a guarantee against poverty see (ILO 2002), p.31.
Informal sector employment is a residual; the lower the employment in the formal
sector, the greater the number who look for work in the informal sector, and hence, the
lower the wages (income) for this sector.
Figure 9 below shows that 43% of the self-employed have taken out loans for business
purposes, compared to only 14% in the formal sector and 16% in the informal wage
labour group. It is clear that the self-employed have to take out loans for setting up
and running a small enterprise. Presumably many of the informal wage workers would
be interested in setting up a small business but are unable to access credit.
To summarise this section, we argue that households have a lexicographic preference
ordering over the different outcomes, formal, self-employment, or informal wage
labour. Migrants, especially rural migrants, have little access to credit or to the formal
labour market, at least until they have spent some years in the urban sector.5. Probability of working in the informal sector
In this section we estimate the probability of a household head working in the informal
wage employment sector to be self-employed or in the formal sector. As discussed
earlier, we make three hypotheses. One is that those households that come from theFigure 9 Purpose of loan by sector.
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of these households may have the entrepreneurial skills or have access to small
amounts of capital to set up as self-employed workers. We also hypothesise that house-
holds coming from higher social classes/groups, and/or that have higher levels of
education are more likely to be working in the formal sector. Further we hypothesise
that migrants who come into the urban areas would initially find employment in the
informal sector and after some time, when they have accumulated sufficient funds or
developed social networks or skills, are more likely to move into the formal sector. In
our analysis below we regard migrants as those whose origin is in a rural area. Individ-
uals who have come from other urban areas are regarded as "urban natives". We
hypothesise that the duration of migration from a rural origin influences the sector of
employment.5.1 Econometrics and identification strategy
The fundamental challenge of estimating the causal impact of migration duration on
the probability of working in the informal sector is the possibility of unobserved indi-
vidual characteristics that might influence the migration decision, survival in a migra-
tion destination, and the duration as well as the likelihood of working in the informal
sector. For example, it might be possible that individuals with unobserved high ability
or entrepreneurial skills might opt to move out of the rural area early in their life and
remain in the urban area, and such unobserved skills and ability will also influence
their choice of sector in the migration destination. Without controlling for this, estima-
tion may be biased and inconsistent.
If we had panel data, we could have used methods to control for individual hetero-
geneity. Another ideal method that could be used to disentangle such unobserved in-
fluences on migration duration and job status would be by using some natural
experimental framework or by randomly inducing people to migrate out of rural areas
to estimate the causal impact of migration on job choice. Lacking the availability of
such methods, we need to opt for an instrumental variable approach (IV) where we can
instrument migration duration with a set of variables which do not have a direct in-
fluence on job placement or current job status.
One recent method to instrument for migration is using the historic migration rate
as an instrument for current migration status for example see, (Woodruff and Zenteno
(2007), Hanson and Woodruff (2003); McKenzie and Rapoport (2007, 2011); López-
Córdoba (2005); and Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2005)). Following the methodology of
these influential works, we have used the historic state-level migration rates as an in-
strument for current migration duration. In particular, we use the Indian migration
rates from data collected in the 1991 census at the state level and use this variable as
an instrument in which the household is currently located.
It can be argued that these historic migration rates are the result of the massive de-
velopment of railroads and other transportation systems in India coupled with the rapid
economic expansion of large cities which created extended job demand. These historic
migration rates can also be considered as signals of migration friendliness, of strong
migration networks that can effectively lower the cost of migration for future potential
migrants and increase the chances of their survival. These signals and networks become
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households today.
Our identifying assumption is that historic state-level migration rates do not affect
the current job placement of the individuals, apart from their influence through
current migration. Instrumental variables estimation relies on this exogeneity
assumption, and so it is important to consider and counteract potential threats to its
validity.
One potential threat is that the historic level of inequality and lower economic class
(lower caste and religious groups) could induce the historic migration rate, and that
they are also influencing the current rate due to intergenerational transition. To tackle
these potential pitfalls, we also used interaction terms of historic migration rate with
the caste dummies as additional instruments. We have also controlled for city, district
and state level fixed effects to control for spatial differences and location preferences,
and report our results based on robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.
An alternative set of instruments would be to use the state level growth rates of GDP
as this would capture the potential pull factor of migration8. The idea of this in-
strumental variable is deep-rooted in the history of Indian economic development and
generated with the aim to capture the post-liberalization of India in 1992. Since state-
level GDP has large heterogeneity, migration decisions of individuals would be based
on comparing likely destinations with income potentialities, therefore could act as an
instrument. As a robustness check, we have reported regression estimates based on the
alternative instrumental variable in all result tables. To increase the precision of our
estimation, we also estimated the equations using the additional set of instruments by
employing the state-level GDP growth rate of India in 1994 interacted with caste dummies.
As our main outcome of interest is whether migrants use the informal sector as their
temporary base (like a stepping stone), we studied the impact of migration duration of
individuals on their placement in the informal sector. The reduced form IV approach
consists of estimating a two-stage model of the following form, where Ij is the outcome
variable of interest (individual j’s current employment sector), Mjk is individual j’s
migration duration, and who is currently staying in State k (years of migration since
originally migrating), and Zk is the set of instrumental variables. Hence the reduced-
form first stage equation for migration Mjk, following Amemiya (1978), would be:Mjk ¼ β0 þ β1Zk þ β2Xjk þ γmk þ mjk ;
Mjk ¼ Mjk ; if M

jk > M0
0; if Mjk ≤ M0
;
 ð1Þ
and the equation for employment in the informal sector Ijk isIik ¼ α0 þ α1Mjk þ β2Xjk þ γ ik þ ijk ;
I jk ¼ 1; if I

jk < I0
0; if Ijk ≥ I0
:
 ð2Þ
Here Mjk is the latent variable for migration decision, and Mjk is the observed yearsof migration duration to the current state k from the time individual j decided to
migrate to state k by comparing the costs and benefits using a net benefit function or
latent index expressed in equation (1). Similarly, Iik is the latent job placement and Ijk
is the dummy of job placement in the formal and informal sectors for the same
Shonchoy and Junankar IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 16 of 272014, 3:9
http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/9individual j living in state k which can be seen arising by comparing the job qualifica-
tions and job related network information (such as informal or formal referral system)
required for the job placement expressed in equation (2). In this setup the first
dependent variable, Mjk, appears in the second equation as an endogenous variable.
Here, Xjk includes the following set of controls: personal and household characteristics,
family background information, family composition information and dependency ratio
(the number of children and old aged persons as a proportion of the household size)9,
religion, and a dummy variable indicating whether or not the person is an urban native
(the dummy is equal to one if the individual i who currently resides in state k is born
in an urban area and zero if the person is a rural-to-urban migrant). Personal charac-
teristics include age, age2, sex, education and marital information, whereas household
characteristics include wealth status of the household which has been constructed using
the principal component analysis of the household non-durable assets10. Dependency
ratio of the household is also controlled for, which is the number of children and old
aged persons as a proportion of household size11. Family background information con-
tains variables on father’s education and occupation history. γMk and γ
I
k are unmeasured
determinants of Mik (e.g., migrant's own community network) and Iik which is fixed at
the state level (e.g., state's specialization in a particular occupational sector). M0 and
I0 are unknown thresholds. Finally, Mik and 
I
ik are non-systematic errors which follow
E Mik Xik ;Zk ; γ
M
k Þ ¼ 0
 and Iik Xik ; γIkÞ ¼ 0 .
Given the setup of binary outcomes with a continuous endogenous variable, we use
maximum-likelihood to estimate a multivariate probit model, which we will refer to by
following the common practice of mentioning it as a IV-Probit model12.5.2 Estimation
As discussed above we estimated a limited-information maximum-likelihood model
for the probability of an individual being in the informal sector as a function of
the duration of migration (for rural-to-urban migrants), demographic characteris-
tics, household characteristics, religion and family background information, shown
in Table 5. In addition we included state, district and city-level fixed effects to
capture unobserved geographical and regional impacts on an individual's job place-
ment in the informal sector. Robust standard errors at the individual level are
employed for all regressions to derive statistical inference. Column (1)-(4) depict
the estimations using historic migration rate based IV whereas Column (5)-(8) used
the economic growth based IV to show the consistency of our estimations. For
robustness check of our estimations, we used full sample (column 1–2 and column
5–6) as well as male only sub-samples, (column 3–4 and column 7–8). In all re-
gressions, using different sub-samples and different IVs, our results are largely con-
sistent and none of the variables changed sign. We reported the marginal effects of
all estimations in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) respectively. To show consistency in
our estimation, we have also estimated a simple probit model without treating the
duration of migration as endogenous, shown in column (9). The probit result
shows a small and negative but statistically insignificance impact of migration du-
ration on probability of someone being in the informal sector. Once we instrument
for migration duration in columns (1)-(8), however, this effect becomes larger and
Table 5 IV-Probit estimates of the probability for informal sector employment
IV1: Historical migration rate: state level IV2: Economic growth of 94: State level Simple probit






















Migration duration −0.073*** −0.028*** −0.073*** −0.028*** −0.073*** −0.028*** −0.073** −0.028** −0.003
(0.016) (0.006) (0.018) (0.007) (0.024) (0.010) (0.032) (0.013) (0.002)
Urban Native −0.512*** −0.187*** −0.517*** −0.190*** −0.509*** −0.186*** −0.511*** −0.188*** −0.130***
(0.085) (0.031) (0.096) (0.035) (0.125) (0.046) (0.164) (0.060) (0.036)
No. of Households 0.032*** 0.012*** 0.033*** 0.013*** 0.032*** 0.012*** 0.033** 0.013*** 0.042***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005) (0.008)
Married 0.108 0.041 0.081 0.031 0.104 0.040 0.079 0.030 0.047
(0.102) (0.038) (0.110) (0.042) (0.103) (0.038) (0.111) (0.042) (0.118)
Primary Education −0.135** −0.051** −0.077 −0.029 −0.134** −0.051** −0.076 −0.029 −0.174***
(0.063) (0.023) (0.066) (0.025) (0.066) (0.024) (0.069) (0.026) (0.066)
Secondary Education −0.306*** −0.114*** −0.268*** −0.101*** −0.306*** −0.115*** −0.267*** −0.101*** −0.364***
(0.062) (0.022) (0.067) (0.024) (0.072) (0.025) (0.083) (0.029) (0.058)
Matric Completed −0.562*** −0.201*** −0.547*** −0.198*** −0.563*** −0.202*** −0.549*** −0.199*** −0.674***
(0.081) (0.024) (0.086) (0.027) (0.107) (0.031) (0.125) (0.037) (0.061)
Tertiary Education −0.716*** −0.246*** −0.700*** −0.243*** −0.715*** −0.246*** −0.700*** −0.244*** −0.880***
(0.101) (0.026) (0.109) (0.029) (0.139) (0.035) (0.167) (0.044) (0.065)
Graduate −0.958*** −0.335*** −0.953*** −0.337*** −0.956*** −0.335*** −0.954*** −0.337*** −1.169***
(0.121) (0.033) (0.131) (0.037) (0.173) (0.047) (0.211) (0.058) (0.063)
High caste 0.101* 0.039* 0.092* 0.036* 0.102* 0.040* 0.093* 0.036* 0.103*
(0.052) (0.020) (0.054) (0.021) (0.052) (0.020) (0.055) (0.021) (0.057)
OBC 0.119** 0.046** 0.122** 0.047** 0.122** 0.047** 0.125* 0.049* 0.182***





















Table 5 IV-Probit estimates of the probability for informal sector employment (Continued)
Dalit 0.015 0.006 −0.009 −0.004 0.019 0.008 −0.005 −0.002 0.022
(0.056) (0.022) (0.059) (0.023) (0.056) (0.022) (0.059) (0.023) (0.062)
Adivasi −0.185** −0.069** −0.180* −0.068** −0.181** −0.068** −0.177* −0.067* −0.195**
(0.090) (0.033) (0.095) (0.035) (0.091) (0.033) (0.097) (0.035) (0.098)
Muslim 0.171** 0.067** 0.191** 0.075** 0.175** 0.068** 0.195* 0.077** 0.297***
(0.073) (0.028) (0.076) (0.030) (0.088) (0.034) (0.100) (0.039) (0.065)
Sikh, Jain 0.086 0.033 0.049 0.019 0.088 0.034 0.051 0.020 0.168
(0.100) (0.039) (0.104) (0.041) (0.105) (0.041) (0.115) (0.045) (0.105)
Christian −0.055 −0.021 −0.074 −0.028 −0.053 −0.020 −0.072 −0.028 −0.106
(0.112) (0.043) (0.119) (0.045) (0.114) (0.043) (0.120) (0.046) (0.120)
Dependency Ratio −0.120* −0.046* −0.121* −0.047* −0.117* −0.045* −0.116 −0.045 −0.104
(0.067) (0.026) (0.071) (0.028) (0.067) (0.026) (0.072) (0.028) (0.073)
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,521 10,521 9,668 9,668 10,485 10,485 9,641 9,641 10521
Log pseudolikelihood −42610 −42610 −38930 −38930 −42490 −42490 −38842 −38842 −5704
chi2 133216 133216 12254 12254 3407 3407 3169 3169 2259
F-Statistics at First Stage 26.91 25.44 26.83 37.69 .
Wald test of exogeneity 14.66*** 14.66*** 13.31*** 13.31*** 4.814** 4.814** 2.805** 2.805** .
Source: Indian Human Development Survey 2005: Authors own Calculations. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance code: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. M.E. Stands for Marginal Effects which have
been calculated at the mean. In all these specifications, we are considering only those as migrant who have migrated from rural to urban areas for jobs. Those who were born in urban setup and migrated to another
urban area for job are not considered as migrants.
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ing in the urban areas, the more likely s/he is to find an employment in the formal
sector, as the person could acquire experience, networks and skill-sets which could
be instrumental in getting a job in the formal sector. Given the fact that some mi-
grants have already returned back after realizing their negligible probability of se-
curing a formal employment in the urban areas, those who remained in the urban
areas, prefer formal employment more than the non-migrants and our results show
that each additional year of migration time-length increases the probability of
being in the formal sector significantly.
We would expect the higher the education of an individual, the lower the pro-
bability of belonging to the informal sector. Our estimations, see Table 5, show
clearly that the higher the level of education of the household head the lower the
probability of being in the informal sector, and the coefficients get smaller (bigger
in absolute value) respectively. The results for father’s education are very similar
to the household head’s education level. Further, we would expect that if the
father of the individual was of a higher social class (in terms of occupation), the
probability of being in the informal sector would be lower. Again the evidence
supports the view that the parent’s occupation clearly influences an individual’s
employment placement: if the father’s occupation is formal in nature like execu-
tive or clerk, the probability of being in the informal sector is lower, while if the
father’s occupation is sales (which is mostly informal in nature in the Indian
context), then there is a higher probability of being in the informal sector. As
discussed earlier, we would expect a person from a socially disadvantaged caste or
religion more likely to be in the informal sector. Our findings show that OBC
(Other Backward Classes) and Muslims are more likely to be in the informal
sector. We did not find any statistically significance for Dalits (the lower social
castes) in the informal sector compared with Brahmins, which may be attributable
to the government’s positive discrimination in employment in the government
sector (reservation system) for Dalits. As we would expect, the wealthier the
household head, the less likely s/he would be in the informal sector. We found
that dependency ration is weakly significant and the sign is negative, suggests that
a higher dependency ratio would lead the person transition out of the informal
sector into the formal sector as the person would be willing to accept any formal
sector job offer which enables better security, however, such an issue appears to
be not very influential in explaining the probability of being in the informal
sector.
Our results suggest that urban natives are more likely to be in the formal sector
as they have more access to better schools, social networks and job information
and referrals compared with the rural-to-urban migrants. Our main variable of
interest is rural migration duration. In all cases it is negative and significant at the
1% level. In other words, the longer a rural migrant has been in an urban area the
more likely that individual would have moved to the formal sector. (Note the rural
migration duration variable has been instrumented).
The validity of IV estimations depends on the power of instruments in explaining
the predicted values at the first stage. As reported, all the first stage regressions
have very high F-statistics (for example, for our preferred specification of column
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of our IVs, and the results overwhelmingly reject the null of no joint significance.
The Wald statistic of the exogeneity test has rejected the null hypothesis of no
endogeneity. We have also tested the instruments using the typical 2SLS models to
test for the over-identification test (Anderson canonical correlations test) and
under-identification test (Sargan-Hansen test) which have duly supported our
instruments.
6.0 Multinomial estimation (Formal, self-employed and Informal wage)
In this section we have separated the informal sector into those who are self-employed
and those who work in the informal or formal sectors as wage labourers to check
whether or not highly qualified individuals are employed in the formal sector and also
to check if migrants use the informal sector as their temporary base. We did this check
by employing a multinomial logit job attainment model following the work of Xin
Meng (2001).
6.1 Econometric modelling
Standard neo-classical economic rationality for an individual’s job placement (labour
supply) is a function of individual endowments and human resources (e.g., level of edu-
cation and experience). However, other related factors that could also have an impact
on an individual’s labour supply, especially in the context of India, could be the family
size (Brown et al. 1980), family background, caste and religious affiliation (see for
example Banerjee and Knight (1985) or Ito (2009)). Another less frequently studied
factor that might be critical is the job related network, for example, job-opening
information, formal and informal channels of job search and referral (see for example
Holzer 1987 or Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2005)). Since urban natives usually have a
better endowment of job-related networks and referrals, we could hypothesise that
migrants will acquire access to such networks as their migration duration increases and
hence are less likely to be in informal wage labour.
A multinomial logit model is specified below to capture how these variables will
influence an individual j’s probability of working in sector s. Formally the model is:








j ¼ 1;……;N ; s ¼ 1;……; S: ð3Þ
where N is the size of the sample, S is the number of sectors and xj is a vector of vari-
ables affecting the labour placement outcome yj. The dependent variable yj for equation
(3) is the nature of an individual’s current job in any of the three sectors: formal sector,
self-employment or informal wage labour sector. Our main variable of interest, years of
migration duration, is endogenous in nature. Hence to allow for the endogeneity in
estimating equation (3), we first used the fitted value of migration duration using all
the instruments (estimation done through OLS). In the second step we used the fitted
value of the migration duration in equation 3. The standard errors of the estimates in
the second step have been estimated through a bootstrapping process with 100
replications.
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The results of marginal effects of endogenous multinomial probit estimations are
reported in Table 6 with full sample and in Table 7 with male only sub-sample. The
dependent variable has been categorized into three groups with formal sector employ-
ment being used as a base category. Column (1)-(3) report the estimations using the
historic migration rate as an IV whereas column (4)-(6) are estimated employing
state-level economic growth of 1994 as IV.
Tables 6 and 7 are broadly similar to those reported in Section 5 of the IV-probit
model (Table 5). For both the self-employed and informal wage labour sectors, educa-
tion, father’s characteristics, and the caste and religion coefficients have essentially the
same signs and significance. The main point of difference is that a rural migrant’s
duration of migration does not significantly influence the probability of being in the
self-employed sector, but is negative and significant for the informal wage labour sector
and positive and significant for formal employment. In other words, we find that the
longer a rural migrant has been in the urban sector the less likely he would be in infor-
mal wage employment and more likely to be in the formal sector. For instance, an indi-
vidual with one additional year’s of migration duration from the rural area reduces his/
her probability to be in informal wage employment by 2.9% and increases the proba-
bility of being in the formal employment by about 3%. However, this variable has no
statistically discernible effect on him/her being in the self-employed sectors. Results on
education are consistent with the other findings that with more years of education, in-
dividuals will less likely be in the informal sector and more likely to be in the formal
sector. In the case of self-employment, education up to the tertiary level does not have
any statistically significant impact; however, for above tertiary level education, the
probability of someone being in self-employed sector is significantly reduced.
The validity of multinomial regression lies on the strong assumption of the Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which means that adding or deleting alternative
outcome categories does not affect the odds among the remaining outcomes. To check
whether this assumption holds in our case, we have performed the test for the IIA
assumption, and we find no evidence violating the assumption (using the full-sample
specification of Table 6).7. Conclusions
In our paper we have defined migrants as those individuals who have migrated from
rural to urban areas. Those who were born in urban areas and migrated to another
urban area are not considered as migrants13. Also note that in our multinomial logit re-
gressions, for the sake of simplicity of estimation, we used only the rural-to-urban mi-
gration duration as endogenous and properly took care of such endogenous regression
by using instruments to predict the fitted value of the variable and plugged in the fitted
value in the final multinomial regression. One could argue, however, that urban-
to-urban migration could also be endogenous. We have also used urban-to-urban mi-
gration as endogenous in separate regression estimations in the multinomial logit
framework (not reported) and in a linear probability model, and in both cases the vari-
able was insignificant and did not appear to be influential in explaining the likelihood
of person’s placement in the informal labour market.
Table 6 Marginal effects of multinomial logit regression (full sample)
IV1: Historic migration rate:
state level
IV2: Economic growth of 94:
state level
Full sample Full sample









Migration Duration 0.0305*** −0.00154 −0.0290*** 0.0255** −0.00428 −0.0212**
(0.00993) (0.00719) (0.00877) (0.0124) (0.00804) (0.00962)
Urban Native 0.190*** −0.0206 −0.169*** 0.170*** −0.0328 −0.137***
(0.0470) (0.0371) (0.0364) (0.0600) (0.0400) (0.0420)
No. of Households −0.0150*** 0.00247 0.0126*** −0.0152*** 0.00240* 0.0128***
(0.00302) (0.00175) (0.00255) (0.00312) (0.00140) (0.00277)
Married −0.0322 −0.0219 0.0541* −0.0267 −0.0196 0.0463
(0.0427) (0.0305) (0.0320) (0.0527) (0.0340) (0.0388)
Primary Education 0.0319 0.0308 −0.0627*** 0.0323 0.0310 −0.0633***
(0.0266) (0.0209) (0.0164) (0.0273) (0.0202) (0.0155)
Secondary Education 0.0972*** 0.0208 −0.118*** 0.0971*** 0.0200 −0.117***
(0.0213) (0.0167) (0.0137) (0.0191) (0.0144) (0.0125)
Matric Completed 0.181*** −0.00272 −0.178*** 0.181*** −0.00319 −0.178***
(0.0193) (0.0151) (0.0124) (0.0184) (0.0137) (0.0114)
Tertiary Education 0.220*** −0.0139 −0.206*** 0.220*** −0.0138 −0.206***
(0.0197) (0.0162) (0.0108) (0.0176) (0.0138) (0.00948)
Graduate 0.339*** −0.0454*** −0.293*** 0.339*** −0.0457*** −0.293***
(0.0192) (0.0134) (0.0151) (0.0166) (0.0116) (0.0132)
High caste −0.0474* 0.0254 0.0220 −0.0463* 0.0265* 0.0198
(0.0256) (0.0169) (0.0215) (0.0260) (0.0145) (0.0248)
OBC −0.0659*** 0.0290** 0.0369** −0.0685*** 0.0283* 0.0403*
(0.0208) (0.0145) (0.0178) (0.0244) (0.0158) (0.0211)
Dalit −0.00897 −0.0369*** 0.0458** −0.0104 −0.0371*** 0.0475**
(0.0233) (0.0123) (0.0207) (0.0237) (0.0118) (0.0219)
Adivasi 0.0664* −0.0315 −0.0348 0.0635* −0.0321* −0.0315
(0.0339) (0.0193) (0.0277) (0.0360) (0.0186) (0.0340)
Muslim −0.0945*** 0.0305 0.0640*** −0.101*** 0.0277 0.0732***
(0.0282) (0.0190) (0.0231) (0.0288) (0.0214) (0.0273)
Sikh, Jain −0.0391 0.0342 0.00493 −0.0425 0.0321 0.0105
(0.0464) (0.0307) (0.0473) (0.0463) (0.0317) (0.0467)
Christian 0.0301 −0.0680*** 0.0379 0.0334 −0.0674*** 0.0340
(0.0479) (0.0234) (0.0457) (0.0441) (0.0194) (0.0417)
Dependency Ratio 0.0524* −0.0244 −0.0279 0.0485* −0.0262* −0.0223
(0.0286) (0.0158) (0.0244) (0.0291) (0.0153) (0.0222)
Observations 10,521 10,521 10,521 10,485 10,485 10,485
Source: Indian Human Development Survey 2005: Authors own Calculations. Notes: Robust standard errors in
parentheses. The standard errors of the estimates in the second step have been estimated through a bootstrapping
process with 100 replications. Significance code: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. In all these specifications, we are
considering only those as migrant who have migrated from rural to urban areas for jobs. Those who were born in urban
setup and migrated to another urban area for job are not considered as migrants.
In the regression we also control for head of the households age, age squared, sex, asset status and fathers education
and occupation. All regressions controlled for district, state and city fixed effects as well.
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Table 7 Marginal effects of multinomial logit regression (male only sample)
IV1: Historic migration rate:
state level
IV2: Economic growth of 94:
state level
Full sample Full sample









Migration Duration 0.0306** 0.00113 −0.0317*** 0.0235* −0.00190 −0.0216**
(0.0119) (0.00805) (0.00925) (0.0138) (0.00845) (0.0105)
Urban Native 0.190*** −0.00916 −0.181*** 0.163** −0.0229 −0.140***
(0.0574) (0.0437) (0.0359) (0.0675) (0.0440) (0.0460)
No. of Households −0.0162*** 0.00251 0.0137*** −0.0166*** 0.00235 0.0143***
(0.00335) (0.00180) (0.00272) (0.00366) (0.00196) (0.00307)
Married −0.0223 −0.0238 0.0462 −0.0171 −0.0226 0.0396
(0.0448) (0.0351) (0.0340) (0.0559) (0.0403) (0.0393)
Primary Education 0.00532 0.0435** −0.0488*** 0.00467 0.0450* −0.0497***
(0.0272) (0.0219) (0.0153) (0.0328) (0.0251) (0.0186)
Secondary Education 0.0827*** 0.0257 −0.108*** 0.0815*** 0.0266 −0.108***
(0.0241) (0.0181) (0.0152) (0.0262) (0.0190) (0.0158)
Matric Completed 0.178*** −0.000493 −0.177*** 0.177*** −0.000998 −0.176***
(0.0219) (0.0169) (0.0129) (0.0247) (0) (0.0143)
Tertiary Education 0.217*** −0.0108 −0.206*** 0.216*** −0.0109 −0.205***
(0.0196) (0.0163) (0.0121) (0.0231) (0.0193) (0.0130)
Graduate 0.339*** −0.0422*** −0.297*** 0.339*** −0.0438*** −0.295***
(0.0208) (0.0141) (0.0159) (0.0231) (0.0164) (0.0160)
High caste −0.0423* 0.0254* 0.0170 −0.0407 0.0272 0.0136
(0.0232) (0.0147) (0.0215) (0.0250) (0.0167) (0.0249)
OBC −0.0658*** 0.0315** 0.0342 −0.0685** 0.0315** 0.0370
(0.0208) (0.0157) (0.0217) (0.0288) (0.0151) (0.0250)
Dalit 0.00337 −0.0401*** 0.0367 0.00249 −0.0422*** 0.0397
(0.0255) (0.0122) (0.0242) (0.0271) (0.0139) (0.0271)
Adivasi 0.0668* −0.0257 −0.0411 0.0646 −0.0273 −0.0373
(0.0374) (0.0216) (0.0305) (0.0447) (0.0228) (0.0372)
Muslim −0.104*** 0.0362 0.0674** −0.110*** 0.0344* 0.0761**
(0.0326) (0.0227) (0.0307) (0.0331) (0.0204) (0.0316)
Sikh, Jain −0.0211 0.0373 −0.0162 −0.0273 0.0350 −0.00766
(0.0409) (0.0308) (0.0435) (0.0473) (0.0292) (0.0437)
Christian 0.0387 −0.0723 0.0336 0.0413 −0.0747 0.0335
(0.0923) (0.116) (0.0557) (0.0729) (0.0766) (0.0534)
Dependency Ratio 0.0526** −0.0272 −0.0254 0.0482* −0.0292* −0.0189
(0.0259) (0.0171) (0.0244) (0.0280) (0.0156) (0.0243)
Observations 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,641 9,641 9,641
Source: Indian Human Development Survey 2005: Authors own Calculations.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors of the estimates in the second step have been
estimated through a bootstrapping process with 100 replications. Significance code: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. In all
these specifications, we are considering only those as migrant who have migrated from rural to urban areas for jobs.
Those who were born in urban setup and migrated to another urban area for job are not considered as migrants.
In the regression we also control for head of the households age, age squared, sex, asset status and fathers education
and occupation. All regressions controlled for district, state and city fixed effects as well.
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http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/9We argued that Indian urban sector appears to have segmented labour markets:
people who are from the lower social classes (castes or religions) are more likely to
work in the informal sector. We found that getting more education is one way of get-
ting a job in the formal sector, but perhaps more important are family networks in pro-
viding an entry into the formal labour market. We argued that when rural migrants
move to the urban sector, they initially find themselves working in the informal sector
where they have low incomes and mostly employed in industries like construction,
manufacturing, wholesale and retail trades, restaurants and hotels, transport, and social
and personal services. Their occupations are mainly in the lower social grades, such as
production and related work, transport, sales and service work, and working as
labourers. We noted that caste and religion play important roles for the employment
and job placement as we see that Brahmins and high caste people are more likely to be
in higher level occupations, whereas Dalits and Muslims is mostly employed in non-
agricultural day-labour or as artisans.
We argued that there is a hierarchy of preferences that people would prefer to work
in the formal sector, with the self-employed sector being the second choice, and lastly
working in the informal wage labour market. However, entry into the formal sector is
constrained by education, social class, and family ties. Self-employment is constrained
by access to the credit market.
We estimated a model of the probability of working in the informal sector as a func-
tion of demographic characteristics, education, father’s education and occupation, caste
and religion, and duration of a migrant in his/her present occupation. We distinguished
between migrants who had come from rural areas from those who had moved from
other urban areas. We treated the duration of the migrant as an endogenous variable
and estimated a two-stage least-squares model. We found that most of the explanatory
variables were significant and of the expected signs. In particular, we found that indi-
vidual's own education as well as father’s education and occupational status play signifi-
cant role in the job placement equation. We also found that Muslims and Other
Backward Classes were more likely to be working in the informal sector.
The most interesting finding of our research is that the length of time a rural migrant
spends in the urban sector, the more likely s/he moves out of the informal wage sector.
In other words, the duration of migration from rural areas is inversely related to the
probability of working in the informal sector. This result implies that the longer the
migrant is staying in the urban areas, the more likely s/he is to find an employment in
the formal sector, as the person could capitalize on his acquired experience, networks
and skill-sets due to the migration. Since formal employment provides job security,
insurance and other facilities, getting a placement in the formal sector appears to be
more preferred option for migrants compared with non-migrants. If a migrant realizes
that the probability of finding a formal job is really limited, then the person is more
likely to return back to the origin quite early, after comparing the cost and benefits of
holding back in the migration destination. As a result, those who remained in the urban
area, we find that each additional year of migration duration increases the probability
of being in the formal sector for migrants by about 3%. Hence, the longer the duration
in the urban sector the less likely is the migrant to be in the informal sector. The
results support the view that for migrants, the informal wage labour market may be a
stepping stone to a secured life in the formal sector.
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ment is a challenging task. Migrants have a higher attrition probability due to the
mobility of the population. Hence, when a researcher is confronted with a migrant
population, it is difficult to define the population at hand, as there are constant
inflows and outflows of individuals with different traits. Moreover, duration raises the
possibility of right censoring which could not be addressed with the data at hand.
These results need to be researched further using panel data, which unfortunately are
not available as yet.Endnotes
1For a detailed discussion about the concept and measurement of informality, see
Perry et al. (2007). Also see Guha-Khasnobis et al. (2006).
2Schneider et al. (2010) provide estimates of the size of “shadow economies” for a
range of countries. For India their estimate is an average of 22% for the period 1999–
2006. This is based on macroeconomic estimates for a group of countries using the
MIMIC method. However, their estimates rely on only 27 (or 20) degrees of freedom.
As our research is primarily about the informal labour market we do not wish to enter
into debates about different estimates of the share of the shadow (informal) economy
in GDP.
3A “good” school would almost certainly be an established private school.
4It has been suggested by McMillan and Rodrik (McMillan and Rodrik 2011) that in
Latin America the rationalisation of some firms led to lower employment in the formal
sector with the redundant workers moving to the lower productivity informal sector,
hence average productivity fell.
5Of course, some people may prefer informal sector activities, see Perry et al. (2007).
6“Indeed most of the informal salaried appear to be queing for more desirable jobs in
either the formal salaried sector or as self-employed workers…”, p. 6, Perry et al.
(2007).
7Perry et al. (2007) has detailed information about Latin America. Alice Sindzingre
(in Guha-Khasnobis et al. (2006) also points out that there is a huge variation in earn-
ings and that informal business enterprises heads may have higher earnings than the
average wage in the formal sector.
8We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this alternative instrument.
9This variable ranks the value of non-durable assets from 1 to 6 Rank 1, the lowest, is
households with a total value of non-durables of less than 500 rupees. Rank 6, the high-
est, is households with asset valued at more than 20,000 rupees. (On 12th March 2013
the exchange rate was: 100 INR=1.84 USD.
10We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this important control variable.
11Estimations were carried out by using the IVProbit command with MLE option in
STATA version 13.
12Those who were born in other countries are not part of the sample in our
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